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Quantum homomorphic encryption
for circuits of low T-gate complexity
Anne Broadbent∗ and Stacey Jeffery†
Abstract
Fully homomorphic encryption is an encryption method with the property that any com-
putation on the plaintext can be performed by a party having access to the ciphertext only.
Here, we formally define and give schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption, which is the
encryption of quantum information such that quantum computations can be performed given
the ciphertext only. Our schemes allow for arbitrary Clifford group gates, but become inefficient
for circuits with large complexity, measured in terms of the non-Clifford portion of the circuit
(we use the “π/8” non-Clifford group gate, also known as the T-gate).
More specifically, two schemes are proposed: the first scheme has a decryption procedure
whose complexity scales with the square of the number of T-gates (compared with a trivial
scheme in which the complexity scales with the total number of gates); the second scheme uses
a quantum evaluation key of length given by a polynomial of degree exponential in the circuit’s
T-gate depth, yielding a homomorphic scheme for quantum circuits with constant T-depth.
Both schemes build on a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
A further contribution of ours is to formally define the security of encryption schemes for
quantum messages: we define quantum indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks in
both the public- and private-key settings. In this context, we show the equivalence of several
definitions.
Our schemes are the first of their kind that are secure under modern cryptographic defi-
nitions, and can be seen as a quantum analogue of classical results establishing homomorphic
encryption for circuits with a limited number of multiplication gates. Historically, such results
appeared as precursors to the breakthrough result establishing classical fully homomorphic en-
cryption.
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1 Introduction
An encryption scheme is homomorphic over some set of circuits S if any circuit in S can be
evaluated on an encrypted input. That is, given an encryption of the message m, it is possible to
produce a ciphertext that decrypts to the output of the circuit C on input m, for any C ∈ S . In
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), S is the set of all classical circuits. FHE was introduced in
1978 by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78], but the existence of such a scheme was an open
problem for over 30 years. Some early public-key encryption schemes were homomorphic over the
set of circuits consisting of only additions [GM84, Pai99] or over the set of circuits consisting of
only multiplications [ElG85]. Several steps were made towards FHE, with schemes that were ho-
momorphic over increasingly large circuit classes, such as circuits containing additions and a single
multiplication [BGN05], or of logarithmic depth [SYY99], until finally in 2009, Gentry established a
breakthrough result by giving the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Gen09b]. Follow-up
work showed that FHE could be simplified [DGHV10], and based on standard assumptions, such as
learning with errors [BV11]. The advent of FHE has unleashed a series of far-reaching consequences,
such as delegating computations in a cloud architecture, and functional encryption [GKP+13]. For
a survey on fully homomorphic encryption, see [Vai11].
Quantum cryptography is the study of cryptography in light of quantum information. One
branch of quantum cryptography revisits classical primitives in the light of quantum information,
establishing either no-go results (e.g. [LC97, May97]), or qualitative improvements achieved with
quantum information (e.g. [BB84]). Another branch of quantum cryptography seeks to establish
quantum cryptographic functionality, for instance in multiparty quantum computation [BOCG+06]
or quantum message authentication [BCG+02]. The study of quantum cryptography is notorious
for its subtleties and challenges, ranging from dealing with “purification attacks” [LC97, May97] to
dealing with situations that are unique to the quantum world (such as “quantum rewinding” [Wat06,
Unr12]).
A number of works have studied the cryptographic implications of the secure delegation of
quantum computation, including: Childs [Chi05]; Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi [BFK09];
Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [ABOE10]; Vedran, Fitzsimons, Portmann and Renner [VFPR14];
Broadbent, Gutoski and Stebila [BGS13]; Fisher et al. [FBS+14]; and Broadbent [Bro15]. None
of these works, however directly address the question of quantum homomorphic encryption, since
they are interactive schemes, and the work of the client is proportional to the size of the circuit
being evaluated (and thus, they do not satisfy the compactness requirement of fully homomorphic
encryption, even if we allow interaction). Non-interactive approaches are given by Arrighi and
Salvail [AS06], Rohde, Fitzsimons and Gilchrist [RFG12] and Tan, Kettlewell, Ouyang, Chen and
Fitzsimons [TKO+14]. However, none of these approaches are applicable to universal circuit fam-
ilies. Furthermore, in the case of [AS06], security is given only in terms of cheat sensitivity, while
both [RFG12] and [TKO+14] only bound the leakage of their encoding schemes.
Recent work by Yu, Pe´rez-Delgado and Fitzsimons [YPDF14] examines the question of perfect
security and correctness for quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE), concluding that the
trivial scheme is optimal in this context. In light of this result, it is natural to consider compu-
tational assumptions in achieving QFHE. Indeed, the question of computationally secure QFHE
remains an open problem; our contribution makes progress in this direction by presenting the first
schemes that are homomorphic for a large class of quantum circuits.
1.1 Summary of Contributions and Techniques
We introduce schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE), the quantum version of ho-
momorphic encryption; we are thus interested in establishing functionality for the evaluation of
quantum circuits on encrypted quantum data. In terms of definitions, we contribute by giving the
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first definition of quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) in the computational setting, in the
case of both public-key and symmetric-key cryptosystems. As a consequence, we give the first
formal definition (and scheme) for the public-key encryption of quantum information, where secu-
rity is given in terms of quantum indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks—for which
we show the equivalence of a number of definitions, including security for multiple messages.
Prior work considered the computational setting for quantum encryption of classical plaintexts
only [OTU00, Kos07, XY12].
In terms of QHE schemes, we start by using straightforward techniques to construct a scheme
that is homomorphic for Clifford circuits (or, more generally, stabilizer circuits). This can be seen
as an analogue to a classical scheme that is homomorphic for linear circuits (circuits performing
only additions). While Clifford circuits are not universal for quantum computation, this already
yields a range of applications for quantum information processing, including encoding and decoding
into stabilizer codes. Our quantum public-key encryption scheme is a hybrid of a classical public-
key fully homomorphic encryption scheme and the quantum one-time pad [AMTW00]. Intuitively,
the scheme works by encrypting the quantum register with a quantum one-time pad, and then
encrypting the one-time pad encryption keys with a classical public-key FHE scheme. Since Clifford
circuits conjugate Pauli operators to Pauli operators, any Clifford circuit can be directly applied to
the encrypted quantum register; the homomorphic property of the classical encryption scheme is
used to update the encryption key. Of course, we specify that the classical FHE scheme should be
secure against quantum adversaries. By using, e.g., the scheme from [BV11], we get security based
on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05, Reg09]; this has been equated with worst-
case hardness of “short vector problems” on arbitrary lattices [MR09], which is widely believed to
be a quantum-safe (or “post-quantum”) assumption.
For universal quantum computations, we must evaluate a non-Clifford gate, for which we choose
the “T” gate (also known as “R” or “π/8”). Applying the above principle we run into trouble,
since TXaZb = XaZa⊕bPaT. That is, conditioned on the quantum one-time pad encryption key
a, b ∈ {0, 1}, the output picks up an undesirable non-Pauli error. Our main contribution is to
present two schemes, EPR and AUX, that deal with this situation in two different ways:
EPR: The main idea of EPR (named after the famous Einstein-Podolski-Rosen trio [EPR35]) is to
use entangled quantum registers to enable corrections within the circuit at the time of decryp-
tion. This scheme is efficient for any quantum circuit, however, it fails to meet a requirement
for fully homomorphic encryption called compactness, which requires that the complexity of
the decryption procedure be independent of the evaluated circuit. More specifically, the com-
plexity of the decryption procedure for EPR scales with the square of the number of T-gates.
This gives an advantage over the trivial scheme whenever the number of T-gates in the eval-
uated circuit is less than the squareroot of the number of gates. (The trivial scheme consists
of appending to the ciphertext a description of the circuit to be evaluated, and specifying
that it should be applied as part of the decryption procedure.)
AUX: Compared to EPR, the scheme AUX takes a more proactive approach to performing the
correction required for a T-gate: to do this, it uses a number of auxiliary qubits that are
given as part of the evaluation key. Intuitively, these auxiliary qubits encode the required
corrections. In order to ensure universality, a large number of possible corrections must
be available — the length of the evaluation key is thus given by a polynomial of degree
exponential in the circuit’s T-gate depth, yielding a homomorphic scheme that is efficient for
quantum circuits with constant T-depth.
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The two main schemes EPR and AUX are incomparable; for some circuits, EPR is more desirable,
while for others, it is preferable to use AUX. The scheme EPR becomes less compact (and therefore
less interesting, since it approaches the trivial scheme), as the number of T-gates increases, while
the scheme AUX becomes inefficient (extremely rapidly) as the depth of T-gates increases.
Our results can be viewed as a quantum analogue of precursory results to classical fully ho-
momorphic encryption, which established the homomorphic property of encryption schemes that
tolerate a limited amount of operations. One difference is that, while these schemes started with the
modest goal of just a single multiplication (the addition operation being “easy”), we have already
allowed for at the very least a constant number, and, depending on the circuit, up to a polynomial
number of “hard” operations, namely of T-gates.
Our schemes use the existence of classical FHE, although at the expense of a slightly more
complicated exposition, a classical scheme that is homomorphic only for linear circuits would ac-
tually suffice. We see the relationship between our schemes and classical FHE as a strength of our
result, via the following interpretation: classical FHE is sufficient to enable QHE for a large fam-
ily of circuits, and perhaps by taking greater advantage of the fully homomorphic property of the
classical scheme in some as yet unknown way, our ideas might be extended to larger classes of quan-
tum circuits. With this in mind, and for ease of exposition, we use a classical fully homomorphic
encryption scheme for all of our quantum homomorphic encryption schemes.
An additional contribution of ours is conceptual: in the context of quantum circuits, it had been
known for some time now that the non-Clifford part of a quantum computation is the “difficult” one
(this phenomena appears, e.g. in the context of quantum simulations [Got98], fault-tolerant quan-
tum computation [BK05] and quantum secure function evaluation [DNS10, DNS12, BOCG+06]).
This has motivated a series of theoretical work seeking to optimize quantum circuits in terms of their
T-gate complexity [Sel13, KMM13]. In particular, Amy, Maslov, Mosca, and Roetteler [AMMR13]
recently proposed T-depth as a cost function, the idea being to count the number of T-layers in a
quantum circuit and optimize over this parameter. Our contribution adds to this understanding,
showing that, in the context of quantum homomorphic encryption, the main challenge is to evaluate
non-Clifford gates, the bottleneck being, more precisely, the depth of the T-gate part of the circuit.
Organization. Some preliminaries and notation are given in Sec. 2. We give formal definitions
of quantum homomorphic encryption and related concepts, including security definitions, in Sec. 3;
this allows us to formally state our results in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 contains a basic quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme, CL, for Clifford circuits that is used as a basis for EPR, the entanglement-
based quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (Sec. 6), and for AUX, the auxiliary-qubit based
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (Sec. 7).
2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Notation
A negligible function, η(·), is a function such that for every polynomial p(·), there exists an N such
that for all integers n > N it holds that η(n) < 1p(n) . As a convention, if a is a classical plaintext,
we denote its encryption by a˜. Throughout this work we use κ to indicate the security parameter.
For a detailed and rigorous introduction to quantum information theory, we refer the reader
to [Wat13]. In the remainder of this section, we give a brief overview of some of the necessary
concepts, as well as our specific notation.
A quantum register is a quantum system, which we view as a physical object that stores quantum
information. The contents of a quantum register are mathematically modelled as the set of trace-1,
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positive semidefinite operators, called density operators, on X , where X is a complex Euclidean
space. We denote the set of density operators on any space X by D(X ).
Quantum registers are denoted with calligraphic typeset, such as X , Y. Two (or more) quantum
systems, X and Y, form a composite system by the tensor product of the subsystems, X ⊗ Y. If
ρ ∈ D(X ⊗ Y) is a state on the joint system, we write ρX to denote TrY(ρ). If X and Y have the
same dimension, we denote this by X ≡ Y.
The trace distance between two states, ρ and σ, is defined ∆(ρ, σ) := Tr
(√
(ρ− σ)†(ρ− σ)
)
.
A density matrix that is diagonal in the computational basis corresponds to a classical random
variable. For a random variable X on some set ΣX , we define ρ(X) :=
∑
x∈ΣX Pr[X = x]|x〉〈x|,
the density matrix corresponding to X. A classical-quantum state is a state of the form ρMA =∑
x Pr[X = x]|x〉〈x|M ⊗ ρAx .
One special quantum state on any system X is the completely mixed state, 1dimX IX , which we
will sometimes denote by $ (where X should be implicit from the context). When X is interpreted
as CS for some finite set S, then $ corresponds to the uniform distribution on S.
A quantum channel Φ : D(A)→ D(B) refers to any physically-realizable mapping on quantum
registers. The identity channel on register R is denoted IR. Let Φ be a quantum channel acting on
register A, and ρAE a quantum system held in the joint registers A⊗E . Then to simplify notation,
when it is clear from the context, we write Φ(ρAE ) to mean (Φ⊗ I)(ρAE ).
We mention a special type of channel, a conditional quantum channel, which, on input the
classical-quantum state
∑
x Pr[x]|x〉〈x|M ⊗ ρAx , outputs the quantum state:
TrM
(∑
x
Pr[x]|x〉〈x|M ⊗ Φx(ρAx )
)
for quantum channels Φx : D(A)→ D(B).
Unless otherwise specified, a quantum measurement refers to a measurement in the compu-
tational basis. A quantum algorithm is a polynomial-time uniform family of quantum circuits,
implementing a family of quantum channels.
2.2 Quantum Circuits
We work with the set of quantum gates consisting of single-qubit preparation in the |0〉 state,
single-qubit measurements, as well as the gates the following unitary gates:
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, P =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, T =
[
1 0
0 eiπ/4
]
,
H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, and CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 .
The set {X,Z,P,CNOT,H} applied to arbitrary wires (redundantly) generates the Clifford group,
and adding any non-Clifford gate, such as T, gives a generating set for all quantum circuits. We
note the following relations between these gates:
XZ = −ZX, T2 = P, P2 = Z, HXH = Z, TP = PT, PZ = ZP.
A classical circuit is layered if it consists of alternating layers of either all ‘+’ gates or all ‘×’
gates. The multiplicative depth of a layered circuit is the number of ‘×’ layers. As we see in this
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work, a natural quantum analogue of ‘+’ gates are Clifford group gates, while the analogue of
the ‘×’ gate is the T-gate.1 Thus, a layered quantum circuit consists of alternating layers of either
all Clifford group gates, or T-gates. Then the T-depth of a layered quantum circuit is the number
of such T layers [AMMR13].
2.3 Quantum One-time Pad
For a single-qubit system ρ in register R, and a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote by QEnca,b : R → R the
quantum one-time pad encryption and by QDeca,b : R → R the quantum one-time pad decryp-
tion [AMTW00], namely:
QEnca,b : ρ 7→ XaZbρZbXa and QDeca,b : ρ 7→ XaZbρZbXa. (1)
It is easy to see that QDeca,b ◦ QEnca,b = IR. By specifying that (a, b) be chosen uniformly at
random, we get that the encryption maps any input to the completely mixed state (from the point
of view of the adversary), since for all ρ,
1
4
∑
a,b
XaZbρZbXa =
I2
2
. (2)
3 Definitions
In this section, we formally define QHE schemes and their properties. In Sec. 3.1, we first review
classical FHE, and then define QHE in the public-key setting. Sec. 3.2 carefully defines the security
of QHE, by considering two definitions for security under chosen plaintext attacks, and showing
that they are equivalent. Sec. 3.3 defines correctness and compactness for QHE, culminating in
a complete definition of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (Def. 3.8). Sec. 3.4 deals with
an important subtlety that arises in the quantum case: due to the no-cloning theorem, when a
large system is encrypted with some auxiliary quantum information needed for decryption, that
auxiliary information cannot be copied and given to every subsystem, but rather, the system must
now be decrypted as a whole, rather than subsystem-by-subsystem. We also define compactness
and quasi-compactness in this context. Finally, for technical reasons, one of our schemes (AUX)
must be used in the symmetric-key setting, which we define in Sec. 3.5. We do not address the
issue of circuit privacy [GHV10], leaving this question for future work.
3.1 Classical and Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
Our schemes rely on a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme; for completeness, we include
a definition in App. A. Since our adversaries are modelled as being quantum polynomial-time, we
need a further security guarantee on the classical scheme, namely that it is secure against quantum
adversaries (see Def. 3.1). Fortunately, much of classical fully homomorphic encryption uses lattice-
based cryptography, which exploits one of the few conjectured “quantum-safe” assumptions [MR09].
Among all known solutions, the scheme of [BV11] appears to be the best for our purposes, as it
bases its security on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05, Reg09], which has been
equated with worst-case hardness of “short vector problems” on arbitrary lattices.
1The analogy is due to the “easiness” of performing Clifford group computations on encrypted data, versus
the “hardness” of performing non-Clifford group computations. Another way of seeing this is that the (reversible)
quantum analogue of multiplication is the Toffoli gate: |x, y, z〉 7→ |x, y, x · y⊕ z〉. The Toffoli is a non-Clifford group
gate that can be expressed in terms of T-gates [Sel13].
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Definition 3.1 (q-IND-CPA). A classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE is q-IND-CPA
secure if for any quantum polynomial-time adversary A , there exists a negligible function η such
that for (pk, evk, sk)← HE.Keygen(1κ):
|Pr[A (pk, evk,HE.Encpk(0)) = 1]− Pr[A (pk, evk,HE.Encpk(1)) = 1]| ≤ η(κ) .
We note that a number of recent works examine the security of classical schemes against quantum
superposition attacks [Zha12, BDF+11, BZ13]. In this context, our definition of q-IND-CPA above
models security for classical plaintexts only (with an arbitrary learning phase, since the public key is
given). Furthermore, we note that a classical homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA,
is also IND-CPA. The converse, however, may not be true (in particular, if the IND-CPA property
depends on a computational assumption that is broken by quantum computers). Note, however,
that any proof that a scheme is IND-CPA can potentially be turned into a proof for q-IND-CPA if
all statements still hold when “probabilistic polynomial-time adversary” is replaced by “quantum
polynomial-time adversary” (see [Son14]).
We now give our new definitions for quantum homomorphic encryption. In our definitions,
both pk, the public encryption key, and sk, the secret decryption key, are classical, whereas the
evaluation key is allowed to be a quantum state. This choice is simply based on what is needed by
our schemes.
Definition 3.2 (QHE). A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a 4-tuple of quantum
algorithms (QHE.KeyGen,QHE.Enc,QHE.Eval,QHE.Dec):
Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen : 1κ → (pk, sk, ρevk). This algorithm takes a unary representation
of the security parameter as input and outputs a classical public encryption key pk, a classical
secret decryption key sk and a quantum evaluation key ρevk ∈ D(Revk).
Encryption. QHE.Encpk : D(M) → D(C). For every possible value of pk, the quantum channel
Encpk maps a state in the message space M to a state (the cipherstate) in the cipherspace C.
Homomorphic Evaluation. QHE.EvalC : D(Revk⊗C⊗n)→ D(C′⊗m). For every quantum circuit
C, with induced channel ΦC : D(M⊗n)→ D(M⊗m), we define a channel EvalC that maps an
n-fold cipherstate to an m-fold cipherstate, consuming the evaluation key in the process.2
Decryption. QHE.Decsk : D(C′) → D(M). For every possible value of sk, Decsk is a quantum
channel that maps the state in D(C′) to a quantum state in D(M).
3.2 Security of Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
We now define a notion of security for QHE analogous to the classical notion of indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attack. As in the classical case, there are several possible definitions, rang-
ing from a relatively simple experiment (Def. 3.3) to multiple messages (Def. 3.4). As evidence of
the robustness of these definitions, we show that they are equivalent; this strengthens our results
since security in the most general case follows from security for the simplest definition. The proof
of equivalence is similar to the classical case (see, e.g. [KL08]), and is included in App. B for com-
pleteness. We note that, by taking the evaluation key to be empty, our definitions and theorems are
trivially applicable to the scenario of quantum public-key encryption (i.e. without a homomorphic
property).
2Since we have not specified any requirement on the behaviour of this channel, we can define EvalC to have some
trivial behaviour on some, or even all quantum circuits C. However, for the scheme to have the S -homomorphic
property (Def. 3.6), this cannot be the case for any circuit in S .
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CPA security. The CPA indistinguishability experiment is given below and illustrated in Fig. 1.
The experiment interacts with an adversary A , which is a pair of polynomial-time quantum al-
gorithms (A1,A2) (which we also refer to as adversaries). The first algorithm A1 implements a
quantum channel D(Revk)→ D(M⊗E) conditioned on pk, where E is an arbitrary environment.
The second algorithm A2 maps D(C ⊗ E) to a bit.
K
ey
G
en
(1
κ
) pk
Revk
pk
A1
M
E
Ξcpa,rQHE C
A2 r′
Ξcpa,0QHE : |0〉M Encpk CM
Ξcpa,1QHE : Encpk
M C
Figure 1: The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment.
The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment PubK
cpa
A ,QHE(κ)
1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρevk).
2. Adversary A1 is given (pk, ρevk) and outputs a quantum state on M⊗E .
3. For r ∈ {0, 1}, let Ξcpa,rQHE : D(M) → D(C) be: Ξcpa,0QHE (ρ) = QHE.Encpk(|0〉〈0|) and Ξcpa,1QHE (ρ) =
QHE.Encpk(ρ). A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξcpa,rQHE is applied to the state inM (the
output being a state in C).
4. Adversary A2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r′, we
say that A wins the experiment.
Definition 3.3 (Quantum Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (q-IND-CPA)). A
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA secure if for any quantum poly-
nomial-time adversary A = (A1,A2) there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,QHE(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ) .
CPA-mult security. The CPA-mult indistinguishability experiment is similar to the CPA sce-
nario above, but in this case the adversary chooses two t-tuples of messages, for any t ≥ 1, and the
challenger returns encryptions corresponding to one of the t-tuples. The adversary’s task is then
to guess which of the two t-tuples of messages has been encrypted. The experiment is given below;
the illustration follows closely the one in Fig. 12 of App. B (but with single messages replaced by
t-fold messages).
The quantum CPA-mult indistinguishability experiment PubK
cpa-mult
A ,QHE (κ)
1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρevk).
2. For r ∈ {0, 1}, and t ∈ O(poly(κ)), let Mr = M1r ⊗ · · · ⊗Mtr, where Mi0 ≡ Mi1 ≡ M (for
all i). Adversary A1 is given (pk, ρevk) and outputs a quantum state ρ in M0 ⊗M1 ⊗ E .
3. For r ∈ {0, 1}, let Ξcpa-mult,rQHE : D(M0 ⊗M1)→ D(C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ct) be given by Ξcpa-mult,0QHE (ρ) =
TrM1(Enc
⊗t
pk ⊗ IM1)(ρ) and Ξcpa-mult,1QHE (ρ) = TrM0(IM0 ⊗ Enc⊗tpk )(ρ). A random bit r ∈ {0, 1}
is chosen and (Ξcpa-mult,rQHE ⊗ IE ) is applied to ρ (the output being a state in C⊗t ⊗ E).
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4. Adversary A2 obtains the system in C⊗t ⊗ E and outputs a bit r′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r′, we
say that A wins the experiment.
Definition 3.4 (Quantum Indistinguishability under Multiple Chosen Plaintext Attack). A quan-
tum homomorphic scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult secure if for all quantum polynomial-time
adversaries A = (A1,A2) there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[PubKcpa-mult
A ,QHE (κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ) .
Theorem 3.5 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-mult). Let QHE be a quantum homo-
morphic encryption scheme. Then QHE is q-IND-CPA if and only if QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult.
The proof of Thm. 3.5 is given in App. B.
3.3 Correctness and Compactness of Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
Next, we give, in Def. 3.6, a notion that encapsulates correctness of both encryption and evaluation,
with respect to a class S of quantum circuits (when S is a strict subset of all computations, the
literature sometimes refers to this as a “somewhat homomorphic” scheme). In the classical context,
it is common to restrict attention to circuits that output a single bit, since any deterministic string
can be computed bit-by-bit. We cannot do this quantumly, as a quantum state cannot be described,
or generated, qubit-by-qubit. We therefore consider correctness as a global property of the output.
Furthermore, as quantum data can be entangled, we require that a correct scheme preserve this
entanglement and thus explicitly include an auxiliary space in the definition below.
Definition 3.6 (S -homomorphic). Let S = {Sκ}κ∈N be a class of quantum circuits. A quan-
tum encryption scheme QHE is S -homomorphic (or homomorphic for the class S ) if for any
sequence of circuits {Cκ ∈ Sκ}κ with induced channels ΦCκ : M⊗n(κ) → M⊗m(κ), and input ρ ∈
D(M⊗n(κ) ⊗ E), there exists a negligible function η such that for (pk, sk, ρevk )← QHE.Keygen(1κ):
∆
(
QHE.Dec
⊗m(κ)
sk
(
QHE.EvalCκ
(
ρevk,QHE.Enc
⊗n
pk (ρ)
))
,ΦCκ(ρ)
)
= η(κ) . (3)
We point out two properties of the above definition. First, we do not require that ciphertexts be
decryptable themselves, only that they become decryptable after homomorphic evaluation, however,
as long as QHE is homomorphic for the class of identity circuits, we can effectively decrypt a
ciphertext by first homomorphically evaluating the identity. Second, we do not require that the
output of QHE.Eval be able to undergo additional homomorphic evaluations; indeed, in the case
that the evaluation key ρevk is quantum, it will in general be “consumed” by the QHE.Eval process,
rendering any future applications of QHE.Eval impossible.
Analogously to the classical case, we define compactness (also parametrized by a class of cir-
cuits S ), which requires that the complexity of QHE.Dec be independent of the evaluated circuit,
ruling out trivial quantum fully homomorphic encryption schemes where applying the circuit is
delayed until after decryption (see the text following Def. 3.10 for an informal description of the
trivial scheme, TRIV).
Definition 3.7 (S -compactness). Let S = {Sκ}κ∈N be a class of quantum circuits. A quantum
encryption scheme QHE is S -compact if there exists a polynomial p such that for any sequence of
circuits {Cκ ∈ Sκ}κ, the circuit complexity of applying QHE.Dec to the output of QHE.EvalCκ is at
most p(κ). (That is, the circuit complexity of decryption does not depend on the circuit complexity
of Cκ).
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If QHE is S -compact for S the class of all quantum circuits over some universal gate set, then
we simply say that QHE is compact.
Although this work leaves open the central problem of quantum fully homomorphic encryption,
we have established all the machinery relevant for a formal definition, which we include below.
Definition 3.8 (Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption). A scheme is a quantum fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all quantum
circuits over some universal gate set.
3.4 Indivisible Schemes
In general, a quantum system is not equal to the sum of its parts. Because of this, for one of our
schemes (as given in Sec. 6), it is convenient (if not necessary, by the no-cloning theorem [WZ82])
to define the output of QHE.Eval as containing, in addition to a series of cipherstates corresponding
to each qubit, some auxiliary quantum register, possibly entangled with each cipherstate. Then
the decryption operation, QHE.Dec must operate on the entire quantum system, rather than qubit-
by-qubit. This is in contrast to a classical scheme, in which we could make a copy of the auxiliary
register for each encrypted bit, enabling the decryption of individual bits, without decrypting the
entire system.
Definition 3.9. An indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a quantum homomor-
phic encryption scheme with QHE.Eval and QHE.Dec re-defined as:
Homomorphic Evaluation. QHE.EvalC : D(Revk ⊗ C⊗n) → D(Raux ⊗ C′⊗m). Compared to
QHE.Eval in a standard QHE, this algorithm outputs an additional auxiliary quantum register
Raux. This extra information is used in the decryption phase. Since the state of Raux may
be entangled with the state of each C′, the system in Raux⊗C′⊗m can no longer be considered
subsystem-by-subsystem.
Decryption. QHE.Decsk : D(Raux ⊗ C′⊗m)→ D(M⊗m). For every possible value of sk, Decsk is
a quantum channel that maps an auxiliary register, together with an m-fold cipherstate, to an
m-fold message in D(M⊗m).
We need to define compactness for an indivisible scheme (recall that here, there is no notion of
separating the individual output systems).
Definition 3.10 (S -compactness for an indivisible scheme). Fix a class of quantum circuits,
S = {Sκ}κ∈N. An indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is S -compact
if there exists a polynomial p such that for any sequence of circuits {Cκ ∈ Sκ}κ with induced
channels ΦCκ :M⊗n(κ) →M⊗m(κ), the circuit complexity of applying QHE.Dec⊗m(κ) to the output
of QHE.EvalCκ is at most p(κ,m(κ)). (That is, the circuit complexity of decryption does not depend
on the circuit complexity of Cκ).
The trivial quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme, TRIV, is easily phrased as an indi-
visible scheme. Informally, TRIV is the following:
1. The algorithms TRIV.KeyGen and TRIV.Enc are taken from any quantum public-key encryp-
tion scheme.
2. The algorithm TRIV.Eval simply sets Raux to be the target circuit, C, and otherwise outputs
the cipherstates corresponding to the encrypted inputs.
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3. The algorithm TRIV.Dec first decrypts the cipherstates, then applies C and outputs the result.
Clearly, TRIV is homomorphic, but it is not compact, since TRIV.Dec must evaluate the quantum
circuit C, and so its complexity scales with G(C), the number of gates in C.
Although a decryption procedure with any dependence on G, or any other property of C, is not
compact, it is still interesting to consider schemes whose decryption procedure has complexity that
scales sublinearly in G (such schemes are called quasi-compact schemes [Gen09a]). We give a formal
definition that quantifies this notion for indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption schemes.
Definition 3.11 (quasi-compactness). Let S = {Sκ}κ be the set of all quantum circuits over some
fixed universal gate set. Let f : S → R≥0 be some function on the circuits in S . An indivisible
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is f -quasi-compact if there exists a polynomial p
such that for any sequence of circuits {Cκ ∈ Sκ}κ with induced channels ΦCκ :M⊗n(κ) →M⊗m(κ),
the circuit complexity of decrypting the output of QHE.EvalCκ is at most f(Cκ)p(κ,m(κ)).
This definition allows us to consider schemes whose decryption complexity scales with some
property of the evaluated circuit. We consider such a scaling non-trivial when it is smaller
than G(C), the number of gates in C.
3.5 Quantum Homomorphic Encryption in the Symmetric-Key Setting
We have defined quantum homomorphic encryption as a public-key encryption scheme. For tech-
nical reasons, our final scheme, AUX is given in the symmetric-key setting, so in this section we
define functionality and security for symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption. In the case
of classical fully homomorphic encryption, symmetric-key encryption is known to be equivalent to
public-key encryption [Rot11]. In the quantum case, this is not known. This section also con-
tains the definition of a bounded QHE scheme, which we again require for technical reasons in our
symmetric-key scheme, AUX.
Definition 3.12. A symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a quantum ho-
momorphic encryption scheme with QHE.KeyGen and QHE.Enc re-defined as:
Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen : 1κ → (sk, ρevk). This algorithm takes a unary representation
of the security parameter as input and outputs a secret encryption/decryption key sk and a
quantum evaluation key ρevk ∈ D(Revk).
Encryption. QHE.Encsk : D(M) → D(C). For every possible value of sk, the quantum channel
Decsk maps a state in the message space M to a state (the cipherstate) in the cipherspace C.
Next, we define a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is bounded by n, which forces
the number of ciphertexts encrypted by sk to be at most n. Furthermore, the scheme maintains a
counter, d, of the number of previous encryptions, which can be thought of as allowing the scheme
to avoid key reuse.
Definition 3.13. A bounded symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a sym-
metric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with QHE.KeyGen, QHE.Enc, and QHE.Dec
re-defined as:
Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen : (1κ, 1n)→ (sk, ρevk).
Encryption. QHE.Encsk,d : D(M) → D(C). Every time QHE.Encsk,d is called, the register con-
taining d is incremented: d← d+ 1. If d > n, QHE.Encsk,d outputs ⊥, indicating an error.
Decryption. QHE.Decsk,d : D(C′)→ D(M).
12
Security of Symmetric Key Schemes. In order to define indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks in the symmetric-key setting, we must equip the adversary with an encryption
oracle Encsk(·). An adversary with access to an encryption oracle, A is a tuple of quantum channels
(A (1), . . . ,A (q+1)), such that A (1) : D(X ) → D(M ⊗ E) for some space X , for i = 2, . . . , q,
A (i) : D(C⊗E)→ D(M⊗E), and A (q+1) : D(C⊗E)→ D(Y) for some space Y. The interaction of
the adversary and the encryption oracle is shown in Fig. 2, and for the case of a bounded encryption
scheme, in which the oracle also updates a counter, in Fig. 3.
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Figure 2: An adversary A that makes at most q encryption oracle calls is a list of quantum
channels A (1), . . . ,A (q+1) such that for j = 1, . . . , q, A (j) sends a message to an encryption oracle,
and A (j+1) receives the output. The full interaction is shown on the right, but we use the figure
on the left as a short-hand for this interaction.
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Figure 3: An adversary A that makes at most q encryption oracle calls to a bounded encryption
oracle is a list of quantum channels A (1), . . . ,A (q+1) with the interaction shown on the right. We
use the figure on the left as a short-hand for this interaction.
Just as in the public-key setting, we can define a quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment
for the symmetric-key setting, SymKcpa
A ,QHE(κ). An adversary for SymK
cpa
A ,QHE(κ) is a pair of adver-
saries with access to an encryption oracle A = (A1,A2) = (A
(1)
1 , . . . ,A
(q+1)
1 ,A
(1)
2 , . . . ,A
(q′+1)
2 )
(q is the number of oracle calls before the challenger is called, and q′ is the number of oracle calls
after the challenger is called). The experiment SymKcpa
A ,QHE(κ) is defined below, and shown in Fig. 4.
The quantum symmetric-key CPA indistinguishability experiment SymK
cpa
A ,QHE(κ)
1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (sk, ρevk).
2. A1 is given ρevk, and may make a polynomial number of calls to an encryption oracle
QHE.Encsk before outputting a quantum state in message space M and environment reg-
ister E .
3. A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξcpa,rQHE is applied to the state in M (the output being
a state in C).
4. Adversary A2 obtains the system C ⊗ E and may make a polynomial number of calls to an
encryption oracle QHE.Encsk before outputting a bit r
′.
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5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r = r′ and 0 otherwise. In case r = r′, we
say that A wins the experiment.
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Figure 4: The quantum CPA experiment for symmetric-key systems (left) and bounded symmetric-
key systems (right).
Definition 3.14 (Quantum Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (q-IND-CPA)
for Symmetric Key Schemes). A symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE
is q-IND-CPA secure if for all quantum polynomial-time adversaries with oracle access, A =
(A
(1)
1 , . . . ,A
(q+1)
1 ,A
(1)
2 , . . . ,A
(q′+1)
2 ), there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,QHE(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ).
Similar to the case of public-key encryption (Sec. 3.2), it is straightforward to give the seemingly
stronger variant of q-IND-CPA, q-IND-CPA-mult, which is defined identically to the public-key case
(Def. 3.4) but with an adversary having access to an encryption oracle. However, just as in the
public-key case, it turns out that these definitions are equivalent.
Theorem 3.15 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-mult in symmetric-key schemes). Let
QHE be a symmetric-key quantum homomorphic scheme. Then QHE is q-IND-CPA if and only if
QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult.
The proof of Thm. 3.15 is virtually identical to that of Thm. 3.5, given in App. B.
4 Main Contributions
We now formally state our main results (formal schemes and proofs are given in Sec. 5–7). Our
first theorem, Thm. 4.1, establishes quantum homomorphic encryption for Clifford circuits.
Theorem 4.1. (Clifford scheme, CL) Let S be the class of Clifford circuits. Then assuming the
existence of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure, there exists
a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, compact and S -homomorphic.
Next, we consider two variants of the scheme given by Thm. 4.1. Each variant deals with non-
Clifford group gates — in our case T-gates — in a different way. The first scheme, described in
Thm. 4.2 and formally defined in Sec. 6, uses entanglement to implement T-gates, resulting in a
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme in which the complexity of decryption scales with the
number of T-gates in the homomorphically evaluated circuit.
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Theorem 4.2. (entanglement-based scheme, EPR) Let S be the set of all quantum circuits over
the universal gate set {X,Z,P,H,CNOT,T} (as well as single-qubit preparation and measurement).
Then assuming the existence of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA
secure, there exists an indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, S -
homomorphic and R2-quasi-compact, where R(C) is the number of T-gates in a circuit C.
The compactness of the scheme EPR is nontrival for all circuits in which R2 ≪ G, where G is
the number of gates.
Our second scheme, formally defined in Sec. 7, is based on the use of auxiliary qubits to im-
plement T-gates, resulting in a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is homomorphic for
circuits with constant T-depth, as described in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3. (auxiliary-qubit scheme, AUX) Fix a constant L. Let S be the set of quantum
circuits over the universal gate set {X,Z,P,H,CNOT,T} (as well as single-qubit preparation and
measurement) with T-depth at most L. Then assuming the existence of a classical fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure, there exists a bounded symmetric-key quantum
homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, S -homomorphic and compact.
The QHE scheme in Thm. 4.3 can be seen as somewhat analogous to an important building
block in classical fully homomorphic encryption: a levelled fully homomorphic scheme, which is a
scheme that takes a parameter L, which is an a-priori bound on the depth of the circuit that can
be evaluated. However, we note that in contrast to a levelled fully homomorphic scheme, in which
operations are polynomial in L, the complexity of our scheme is a polynomial of degree exponential
in L, so we really require L to be constant.
As previously noted, Thm. 4.2 and 4.3 are complementary: the scheme EPR becomes less
compact as the number of T-gates increases, while the scheme AUX becomes inefficient as the depth
of T-gates increases.
5 Scheme CL: Homomorphic Encryption for Clifford Circuits
In this section, we present CL, a compact quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for stabilizer
circuits, which consist of Clifford circuits combined with measurements and single-qubit prepara-
tion. This is a building block for the schemes that follow in Sec. 6 and 7. The main theorem we
prove is Thm. 4.1, which follows directly from Thm. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
By definition, Clifford circuits conjugate Pauli operators to Pauli operators [Got98]. In other
words, for any Clifford C, and any Pauli, Q, there exists a Pauli Q′ such that CQ = Q′C. Further-
more, applying a random Pauli operator is a perfectly secure symmetric-key quantum encryption
scheme: the quantum one-time pad (see Sec. 2.3). Combining these observations, we see that it
is possible to perform any Clifford circuit on quantum data that is encrypted using the quantum
one-time pad. We can apply the desired Clifford, C, to the encrypted state Q|ψ〉 to get Q′(C|ψ〉).
Now decrypting the state requires applying the Pauli Q′. If Q can be described by the encryption
key (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn) — that is, Q = X
a1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn — then Q′ can be described by
some key (a′1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n) depending on C and (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn). We describe this de-
pendence by a function fC : F2n2 → F2n2 , which we call a key update rule. We need only consider key
update rules for each gate in our gate set, which consists of single-qubit measurement, single-qubit
preparation, and the one- and two-qubit gates in {X,Z,P,CNOT,H}. For a single-qubit gate C,
since the only keys that are affected are those corresponding to the wire to which C is applied, an
update rule can be more succinctly described by a pair of functions fCa , f
C
b : F
2
2 → F2 such that
when C is applied to the ith wire, a′i = f
C
a (ai, bi) and b
′
i = f
C
b (ai, bi):
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XaiZbi |ψ〉 C Xa′iZb′iC|ψ〉 ai ← a′i = fCa (ai, bi), bi ← b′i = fCb (ai, bi)
For the two-qubit CNOT-gate, the update rule is described by a 4-tuple of functions, since CNOT
acts on two wires. We give the key update rules for all gates in App. C. By applying these rules
after each gate, we can update the key so that the output is correctly decrypted. Such a technique
was already used, e.g. in [Chi05, FBS+14, Bro15].
This solution, however, requires that the key updates be executed by the party holding the en-
cryption keys: an “easy” classical computation, but nevertheless a computation that is polynomial
in the size of the circuit. In the context of quantum homomorphic encryption, the challenge is
therefore to allow the execution of arbitrary Clifford circuits, while maintaining the compactness
condition. Here, we present a quantum public-key encryption scheme which is a hybrid of the
quantum one-time pad and of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This encryption
scheme is used to perform key updates on encrypted quantum one-time pad keys, enabling the com-
putation of arbitrary Clifford group circuits on the encrypted quantum states, while maintaining
the compactness condition. More precisely, to homomorphically evaluate a Clifford circuit consist-
ing of a sequence of gates c1, . . . , cG, we apply the gates to the quantum one-time pad encrypted
message, and homomorphically evaluate the function f c1 ◦ · · · ◦ f cG on the encrypted one-time pad
keys a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, where ◦ denotes function composition. To accomplish this, we keep track
of functions for each bit of the quantum one-time pad encryption key, {fa,i, fb,i}ni=1. Since each
of the key update rules presented in App. C is linear, each fa,i and fb,i is a linear polynomial in
F2[a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn] (from the perspective of the evaluation procedure, a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn are
unknowns), so we refer to them as key-polynomials. Before we begin to evaluate the circuit, the key
polynomials are the monomials fa,i = ai and fb,i = bi. As we evaluate each gate cj , we update the
key-polynomials corresponding to the affected wires by composing them with the key update rules.
To compute the new encrypted one-time pad keys once the circuit is complete, we homomorphically
evaluate each key-polynomial on the old encrypted one-time pad keys. It is interesting to note that
since the key update rules (App. C) for stabilizer circuit elements are all linear, for the scheme CL,
the underlying classical fully homomorphic scheme only needs to be additively homomorphic.
We define our scheme CL as a QHE scheme. Here and throughout, we assume HE to be a
classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure (see Def. 3.1 and App. A).
As noted, such a scheme (based on the LWE assumption) could be derived from [BV11]. All of
our schemes operate on qubit circuits, and encrypt qubit-by-qubit. Thus we fix M = C{0,1}.
Ciphertexts consist of quantum states in C{0,1}, combined with classical strings. Specifically, if C is
the output space of HE.Enc, and C ′ is the output space of HE.Eval, then we define C = CC×C ⊗X ,
where X ≡ C{0,1}, and C′ = CC′×C′ ⊗ X .
Key Generation. CL.KeyGen(1κ). For key generation, execute (pk , sk , evk) ← HE.Keygen(1κ).
Output the obtained secret key, sk , and public key, pk . The evaluation key ρevk takes the
value of the classical state ρ(evk).
Encryption. CL.Encpk : D(M) → D(C). Encryption is defined as the quantum channel that
outputs the classical-quantum state:
CL.Encpk(ρ
M) =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
1
4
ρ(HE.Encpk(a),HE.Encpk(b))⊗ QEnca,b(ρM).
Homomorphic Evaluation. CL.EvalC : D(Revk ⊗ C⊗n)→ D(C′⊗m).
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Suppose C = c1, . . . , cG is a Clifford circuit. For every j = 1, . . . , G such that cj initializes
a fresh qubit, we initialize a new qubit CL.Encpk(|0〉〈0|) and append it to the system. Let
ρ ∈ D(X1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xm), be the composite system consisting of the input quantum system and
the initialized qubits.
1. For all i ∈ [n], set fa,i, fb,i ∈ F2[a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn] as fa,i ← ai, fb,i ← bi.
2. For j = 1, . . . , G such that cj is a gate or a measurement:
(a) Apply the gate cj to the state: ρ← cjρc−1j .
(b) Compose the key update rules with the key-polynomials of the affected wires: if cj
is a single qubit gate or measurement acting on the ith wire, update as (fa,i, fb,i)←
(fa,i ◦f cja , fb,i ◦f cjb ). Otherwise, if cj is a CNOT-gate acting on wires i and i′, update
(fa,i, fa,i′ , fb,i, fb,i′) analogously.
3. Update the classical encryptions by computing
ci = (HE.Eval
fa,i
evk (a˜i),HE.Eval
fb,i
evk(b˜i)).
4. Output (c1, . . . , cm, ρ) (with registers permuted to fit the prescribed form).
Decryption. CL.Decsk : D(C′) → D(M). For a˜, b˜ ∈ C ′, the output space of HE.Eval, decryption
is given by the conditional quantum channel:
CL.Decsk : |a˜〉〈a˜| ⊗ |b˜〉〈b˜| ⊗ ρX 7→ QDecHE.Decsk(a˜),HE.Decsk(b˜)(ρ
X ),
which can be implemented by first decoding the classical registers to obtain a = HE.Encsk(a˜)
and b = HE.Encsk(b˜), applying QDeca,b, and then tracing out C
C′×C′ .
We have chosen to present CL.Encpk and CL.Decsk as quantum channels, since they are easily
seen to be polynomial-time implementable. Note, however, that for more complicated quantum
channels such as CL.Eval we will generally prefer their description in terms of a high-level algorithmic
description.
5.1 Analysis of CL
We now analyse the various properties of CL.
Theorem 5.1. Let S be the class of Clifford circuits. Then CL is S -homomorphic.
Proof. This follows from the circuits in App. C, as well as the homomorphic property of HE. In
particular, since the decrypted values of the ciphertexts are correct (except with exponentially small
probability), then Equation (3) is satisfied.
Theorem 5.2. CL is compact.
Proof. Let p be a polynomial such that the complexity of applying HE.Dec to the output of HE.Eval
is at most p(κ) — such a polynomial exists by the compactness of HE. Then decrypting a single
qubit of the output of CL.Eval has complexity at most 2p(κ) + 2, since we must decrypt two keys
a and b and then apply Xa and Zb, so CL is also compact.
Theorem 5.3. Assuming a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme HE that is q-IND-CPA
secure, the quantum homomorphic scheme CL is q-IND-CPA secure.
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Proof. The main part of this proof will be to show that the classical ciphertexts HE.Encpk(a) and
HE.Encpk(b) give at most a negligible advantage. We will then see that without these classical
ciphertexts, the quantum CPA Indistinguishability experiment is independent of r from the per-
spective of the adversary.
Let CL′ be the quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with CL′.KeyGen = CL.KeyGen,
CL′.Eval = CL.Eval, CL′.Dec = CL.Dec, and
CL′.Encpk(ρ) =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
1
4
ρ(HE.Encpk(0),HE.Encpk(0)) ⊗ (XaZbρZbXa)
= ρ(HE.Encpk(0),HE.Encpk(0)) ⊗ 1
2
I2.
Let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary for PubK
cpa
A ,CL(κ). We will define an adversary A
′ = (A ′1 ,A
′
2)
for PubKcpa-mult
A ′,HE (κ). Essentially, A
′ will simulate PubKcpa-mult
A ,CL (κ), except that when it simulates
Ξcpa,rCL , it will use Ξ
cpa-mult,s
HE in place of HE.Enc, so that it will actually be running either Ξ
cpa,r
CL (if
s = 1) or Ξcpa,r
CL′
(if s = 0) (see Fig. 5).
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Figure 5: The new adversary A ′ for PubKcpa-mult
A ′,HE , where Ψ is the channel that replaces the system
with |0〉〈0|. Here $ denotes the channel that outputs a completely mixed state, or equivalently, a
uniform random variable. If s = 1, the middle dashed box is Ξcpa,rCL , and if s = 0, Ξ
cpa,r
CL′
.
A ′1(pk, evk): Run A1(pk, evk) to get a state ρ
ME . Choose a uniform random bit r. If r = 0, discard
the M subsystem and replace it with the state |0〉〈0|. Choose uniform random bits a and b,
and apply QEnca,b, the quantum one-time pad, to M, relabelling the resulting system by X .
Input (a, b) and (0, 0) to Ξcpa-mult,sHE .
A ′2 : Run A2 to get a bit r
′. Output 1 if r = r′ and 0 otherwise.
We now compute the probability that A ′ correctly guesses s, which we know must be at most
1
2 + η(κ) for some negligible function, since HE is q-IND-CPA. If s = 1, then A
′ is simulating
PubK
cpa
A ,CL, so the probability that r
′ = r (and thus that s′ = 1 = s) is Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL(κ) = 1].
On the other hand, if s = 0, A2 gets encryptions of 0 rather than HE.Enc(a),HE.Enc(b), so A
′ is
simulating PubKcpa
A ,CL′
, so the probability that r 6= r′, and thus s′ = 0 = s, is Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL′
(κ) = 0].
Then since the total probability that s = s′ is at most 12 + η(κ), we have:
1
2
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL(κ) = 1] +
1
2
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL′
(κ) = 0] ≤ 1
2
+ η(κ)
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL(κ) = 1] + 1− Pr[PubKcpaA ,CL′(κ) = 1] ≤ 1 + 2η(κ)
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL(κ) = 1]− Pr[PubKcpaA ,CL′(κ) = 1] ≤ 2η(κ). (4)
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We complete the proof by noting that when s = 0, since c = (HE.Encpk(0),HE.Encpk(0)), it is
independent of a, b (see Fig. 6).
K
ey
G
en
pk
pk
evk
A1
M
E
$
Ψr¯
a, b
M
XaZb
0, 0
X
H
E
.E
n
c
c
A2 r′
Figure 6: When s = 0, A ′ is simulating PubKcpa
A ,CL′
. In this case, c is independent of a, b, and so
the only dependence on a, b is the quantum-one-time-pad encrypted message in X .
Then from the perspective of A2, since a, b is uniform random, the system X just contains the
completely mixed state $ (see Fig. 7).
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pk
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X
H
E
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n
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c
A2 r′
Figure 7: The circuit from Figure 6 is equivalent to the above circuit, in which the system in M
is replaced with the completely mixed state. Then from the perspective of A , the experiment is
independent of r.
Since the experiment PubKcpa
A ,CL′
is independent of r from the perspective of A , it follows that
Pr[PubKcpa
advA,CL′
(κ) = 1] = 12 . Combining this with Equation (4), we get
Pr[PubKcpa
A ,CL(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ 2η(κ),
which completes the proof, since 2η is still a negligible function.
6 Scheme EPR: T-gate Computation Using Entanglement
In order to achieve universality for quantum circuits, we need to add a non-Clifford group gate,
such as the T-gate. As noted in Sec. 1.1, if we apply the same technique as in Sec. 5 (i.e. to apply
the T-gate on the encrypted quantum data) we run into a problem, since:
TXaZb = XaZa⊕bPaT. (5)
That is, conditioned on a, the output picks up an undesirable P error, which cannot be corrected
by applying Pauli corrections. In [Chi05], Childs arrives at the same conclusion, and makes the
observation that, in the case where a = 1, the evaluation algorithm could be made to correct
this erroneous P-gate by executing a correction (which consists of ZP). As long as the evaluation
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TXaZb|ψ〉
Pa Zk|+〉 (k ∈R {0, 1})
c
Xa⊕cZa⊕b⊕k⊕a·cT|ψ〉
Figure 8: Functionality of the T-gate gadget.
Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 Xi T c
Xfa,i⊕cZfa,i⊕fb,i⊕kt⊕cfa,iT|ψ〉Xi|Φ+〉
Rt
ft ← fa,i
V ← V ∪ {kt}
fa,i ← fa,i ⊕ c
fb,i ← (1⊕ c)fa,i ⊕ fb,i ⊕ ktP
ft H kt
(Part of decryption)
Figure 9: Evaluation protocol for the tth T-gate, applied to the ith wire. The key-polynomials fa,i
and fb,i are in F2[V ]. After the protocol, V gains a new variable corresponding to the unknown
measurement result kt. The dashed box shows part of the decryption procedure, which happens at
some point in the future, after the complete evaluation is finished.
algorithm does not find out if this correction is being executed or not, security holds. The solution
in [Chi05] involves quantum interaction; this was recently improved to a single auxiliary qubit,
coupled with classical interaction [FBS+14, Bro15]. In this section, we base the evaluation of the
T-gate on a modification of this technique, as presented in Fig. 8. The modification is that we allow
the auxiliary qubit to be prepared in a state dependent on the X-encryption key, whereas [FBS+14,
Bro15] explicitly avoids this since it requires the auxiliary qubits to be prepared independently of
the computation. Correctness of Fig. 8 is proven in App. D.
As a proof technique (for establishing security), [FBS+14, Bro15] considers an equivalent,
entanglement-based protocol. Here, we use the idea of exploiting entanglement in order to de-
lay the correction required for the evaluation of the T-gate on encrypted data. The protocol is
illustrated in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 shows that, using the entangled state |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), the conditional P correction
can be delayed. The cost of this is that the value of the measurement result, kt, on auxiliary register
Rt, is undetermined until later, when it is measured as part of the decryption algorithm. Thus we
view the key updates as a symbolic computation: each time a T-gate is applied, an extra variable,
kt, is introduced.
For the first T-gate evaluation (t = 1), the evaluation procedure does not have the knowledge
to evaluate f1 = fa,i, where i is the wire upon which the gate is performed, in order to perform
the correction. It is possible (using the classical scheme HE), to compute a classical ciphertext
f˜1 that decrypts to f1(a1, b1, . . . , an, bn). Thus, for this T-gate, the output part of the auxiliary
system contains both f˜1 and the register R1. As part of the decryption operation, compute f1 ←
HE.Dec(f˜1), and apply P
f1 on R1 before measuring in the Hadamard basis and obtaining k1. From
the point of view of the evaluation procedure, k1 is unknown and so it becomes an unknown part of
the encryption key (in contrast with the previous keys, which are also “unknown”, but to a lesser
degree, since we have access to the classical encrypted values of these keys). The algorithm Eval
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continues in this fashion for values of t up to R; each time, the set of unknown variables increasing
by one. Note that, according to Fig. 9, as well as the linearity of the key update rules, for all t,
ft ∈ F2[a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, k1, . . . , kt−1] is linear (since c is a known constant), so we can write
ft = f
k
t + f
ab
t for f
k
t ∈ F2[k1, . . . , kt−1] and fabt ∈ F2[a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn].
The cost of this construction is that each T-gate adds to the complexity of the decryption
procedure, since, in particular, for each T-gate, we must perform a possible P-correction and a
measurement on an auxiliary qubit. In addition, we cannot evaluate the key-polynomials, nor the
ft, until the variables kt have been measured, so this evaluation must take place in the decryption
phase, increasing the dependence on R, the number of T-gates, to O(R2) We make this dependence
precise in Thm. 6.3.
We now formally define the indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme, EPR. As in
CL, we have message space M = C{0,1} and cipherspace C = CC×C ⊗ X , where C is the output
space of HE.Enc and X ≡ C{0,1}. Since EPR is indivisible, the output space of EPR.EvalC has the
form Raux ⊗ C′⊗m. We require an indivisible scheme, because decryption of any one of the output
qubits requires access to the auxiliary system. In our case, we have Raux = R1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ RR ⊗
(C{0,1}R+1)⊗R⊗ (CC′)⊗R, where R is the number of T-gates in C, C ′ is the output space of HE.Eval,
and Rt ≡ C{0,1} for each t. The classical parts of the auxiliary space allow us to output R linear
polynomials in F2[k1, . . . , kR] corresponding to {fkt }Rt=1, each of which can be represented with R+1
bits; as well as R HE.Eval outputs, corresponding to encryptions of {fabt (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn)}Rt=1.
Similarly, we have C′ = (C{0,1}R+1)⊗2 ⊗ CC′×C′ ⊗ X .
Key Generation. EPR.KeyGen(1κ). The key generation procedure is the same as CL.KeyGen(1κ).
Encryption. EPR.Encpk : D(M)→ D(C). The encryption procedure is the same as CL.Encpk.
Evaluation. EPR.Evalevk. As in CL, apply gates in {X,Z,P,H,CNOT} directly on the encrypted
quantum registers. For the T-gate, use the gadget defined in Fig. 9. This gadget differs from
previous gadgets in that it uses an auxiliary Bell state, |Φ+〉. After the system of the ith wire, Xi,
is measured, relabel half of the Bell state as Xi, and the other half as Rt, which is returned as part
of Raux. The full evaluation procedure is as follows.
1. Set V ← {ai, bi}i∈[n], and ∀ i ∈ [n], set fa,i, fb,i ∈ F2[V ] as fa,i ← ai, fb,i ← bi.
2. Let g1, . . . , gG be a topological ordering of the gates in C. For j = 1, . . . , G, evaluate gj using
the appropriate gadget.
3. Let S be the set of output wires. Let L be the set of labels L = {(a, i), (b, i) : i ∈ S} ∪
{1, . . . , R}. For each α ∈ L, we want to homomorphically evaluate fα to obtain the actual (en-
crypted) key, but we can only actually evaluate the part of fα that is in the variables {ai, bi}i
— the {kt}t are still unknown. Recall that we can write fα = fkα + fabα for fkα ∈ F[k1, . . . , kR]
and fabα ∈ F2[a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn]. Compute f˜abα ← HE.Evalf
ab
α
evk(a˜1, . . . , a˜n, b˜1, . . . , b˜n).
4. Output:
• The m = |S| qubit registers {Xi : i ∈ S} corresponding to the encrypted output of the
circuit;
• The R qubit registers R1, . . . ,RR corresponding to auxiliary states created by T-gadgets;
• The polynomials {fkα}α∈L ⊂ F2[k1, . . . , kR] and the homomorphically evaluated polyno-
mials {f˜abα }α∈L.
Decryption. EPR.Decsk. In order to decrypt, measure the Rt in order from 1 to R, computing
ft(k1, . . . , kt−1) as required. Formally:
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1. For t = 1, . . . , R:
(a) Decrypt fabt ← HE.Decsk(f˜abt ).
(b) Compute a← fkt (k1, . . . , kt−1)⊕ fabt and apply HPa to Rt.
(c) Measure Rt to get kt.
2. Let S be the set of indices of the output qubit registers. For i ∈ S:
(a) Decrypt faba,i ← HE.Decsk(f˜aba,i) and fabb,i ← HE.Decsk(f˜abb,i).
(b) Compute ai ← fka,i(k1, . . . , kt)⊕ faba,i and bi ← fkb,i(k1, . . . , kt)⊕ fabb,i.
3. To each register Xi, apply the map QDecai,bi . Output registers X1, . . . ,Xm.
6.1 Analysis of EPR
We now analyse the various properties of EPR. Since the scheme EPR uses the same KeyGen and
Enc procedures as CL, the following theorem follows from Thm. 5.3.
Theorem 6.1. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then EPR is q-IND-CPA secure.
The next theorem shows the homomorphic property for all circuits (recall that this property is
independent of compactness).
Theorem 6.2. Let S be the class of all quantum circuits. Then EPR is S -homomorphic.
The proof follows from the circuits in App. C, Fig. 9, as well as the homomorphic property
of HE.
Since the complexity of the decryption procedure depends on R, the number of T-gates in
the circuit, it is clear that the scheme EPR is not compact. However, by analysing the circuit’s
dependence on R, we can see that for a very large class of quantum circuits, EPR is non-trivially
quasi-compact. The following theorem is immediate from the decryption procedure.
Theorem 6.3. Let p be a polynomial such that HE.Dec has complexity O(p(κ)). Then the decryp-
tion procedure EPR.Dec has complexity O(R2 +Rp(κ) +mp(κ) +mR).
Thus, the dependence of the complexity of EPR.Dec on the evaluated circuit C is R2:
Corollary 6.4. Let R(C) denote the number of T-gates in a circuit C. Then EPR is R2-quasi-
compact.
This beats the compactness of the trivial scheme for all circuits C such that the number of
T-gates is less than the squareroot of the number of gates; that is R≪ √G.
7 Scheme AUX: T-gate Computation Using Auxiliary States
In the previous QHE scheme, we solved the problem of performing the P correction (Eq. (5)) by
delaying the correction via entanglement. In this section, we present a quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme, AUX, that takes a more proactive approach to dealing with the P correction.
At a high level, AUX can be understood as the following: as part of the evaluation key, AUX.Keygen
outputs a number of auxiliary states. These states “encode” parts of the original encryption key,
and are used to correct for the errors induced by the straightforward application of the T-gate on
the cipherstates. In more details, the auxiliary states encode hidden versions of P corrections, such
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XiX
fa,iZfb,i T c
|+fa,i,k〉 XiX
fa,i⊕cZfa,i⊕fb,i⊕k⊕cfa,iT
fa,i ← fa,i ⊕ c
fb,i ← fa,i ⊕ fb,i ⊕ k ⊕ cfa,i
V ← V ∪ var(k)
Figure 10: A T-gadget for the scheme AUX consists of the above circuit and key-update rules. We
use var(k) to denote the set of variables in the polynomial k, which depends on the construction of
the auxiliary state |+fa,i,k〉, described below.
as |+a,k〉 := ZkPa|+〉 (where k is a random bit and a is an encryption key) that are useful for
the evaluation of the T-gate (see Fig. 10). In general (after having applied prior gates), the exact
auxiliary state will not be available; instead, the Eval procedure combines a number of auxiliary
states in order to create a single copy of a state that is useful for performing the correction. This
combination operation, however, is expensive as it introduces new unknowns (in terms of new
variables as well as “cross-terms”), that need to be corrected in any future T-gate. Thus the size
of the evaluation key grows rapidly, as a polynomial whose degree is exponential in the T-depth.
We can thus tolerate only a constant T-gate depth for this scheme to be efficient.
We further specify that AUX is a symmetric-key encryption scheme. This is because AUX.KeyGen
generates auxiliary qubits that depend on the quantum one-time pad encryption keys. Also, KeyGen
takes an extra parameter 1n, where n is an upper bound on the total number of qubits that
can be encrypted (AUX acts much like a classical one-time pad scheme that picks a fixed-length
encryption key ahead of time). After this bound on the number of encryptions has been attained,
no further qubits can be encrypted. We will suppose without loss of generality that a circuit being
homomorphically evaluated is on n wires. Furthermore, the number and type of auxiliary qubits
will depend on the T-depth of the circuit to be evaluated, L. The scheme will not be able to
homomorphically evaluate circuits with T-depth greater than L. We will see that the number of
required auxiliary states grows super-exponentially in L, so we will require that L be a constant.
Fix a constant L. We will now define a scheme AUX = AUXL that is homomorphic for all circuits
with T-depth at most L.
Auxiliary Qubit Construction. In general, providing the necessary auxiliary states for each
T-gate would require advance knowledge of the key fa,i at the time a T-gate is applied to the i
th
wire. Since this depends on both the circuit being applied and on the prior measurement results,
we appear to be at an impasse. The key observation that allows us to continue with this approach
is that, given auxiliary states |+f1,k1〉 and |+f2,k2〉, we can combine them to get |+f1⊕f2,k〉, for some
k, using the following circuit:
|+f1,k1〉
|+f2,k2〉
|+f1⊕f2,k1⊕k2⊕(f1⊕c)f2〉
c
By iterating this procedure, given auxiliary states |+f1,k1〉, . . . , |+fr,kr〉, we can construct the auxil-
iary state |+f1⊕···⊕fr,k〉, where k =
⊕m
i=1 ki ⊕
⊕r
i=2 cifi ⊕
⊕r
i=1
⊕i−1
j=1 fifj for known values ci.
Thus, if we give many initial auxiliary states of the form {|+ai,ka,i〉, |+bi,kb,i〉}i (with different
keys for different copies), we can construct |+f,k〉 for f a linear function of {ai, bi}i∈[n]. How-
ever, using an auxiliary state |+fa,i,k〉 to facilitate a T-gate on the ith wire introduces the un-
known k into fb,i. In particular, suppose fa,i =
⊕r
j=1 tj for some monomial terms tj ∈ F2[V ].
Then we will need to construct it from auxiliary states |+t1,k1〉, . . . , |+tr ,kr〉, to get |+fa,i,k〉 for
k =
⊕m
i=1 ki ⊕
⊕r
i=2 citi ⊕
⊕r
i=1
⊕i−1
j=1 titj . Thus, after the T-gadget, the new keys f
′
a,i, f
′
b,i are in
unknowns V ∪ {k1, . . . , kr}. Furthermore, because of the cross terms titj, the degree of the key-
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polynomials increases, so we can no longer assume they are linear. Since we can’t produce |+f1f2,k〉
from |+f1,k1〉 and |+f2,k2〉, we need to provide additional auxiliary states for every possible term.
We discuss this more formally below and in Sec. 7.1.
Spaces. As in CL and EPR, we work with qubits: M ≡ C{0,1}. In contrast to our previous
schemes, the classical encryptions of quantum one-time pad keys is part of the evaluation key (for
convenience only), so we have C ≡ C{0,1}. However, after evaluation, the classical encryption of the
new one-time pad keys is needed for decryption, so as in CL, we have C′ ≡ CC′×C′ ⊗ X , where C ′
is the output space of HE.Eval, and X ≡ C{0,1}.
Key Generation. AUX.Keygen(1κ, 1n). The evaluation key contains auxiliary states that allow
each of L layers of T-gates to be implemented. Thus, for each layer, since every wire must have
the possibility to implement a T-gate, for each wire, we need to be able to construct an auxiliary
state |+fa,i,k〉 for some k. Since we can add auxiliary states, we can construct this auxiliary state
if we have an auxiliary state for each term in fa,i. Since fa,i depends on the circuit, which we do
not know in advance, we need to provide an auxiliary state for every term that could possibly be
in fa,i at the ℓ
th layer of T-gates, for ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
We now define sets of monomials T1, . . . , TL such that the keys in the ℓ
th layer consist of sums
of terms from Tℓ (as proven in Lemma 7.1). Let V1 := {ai, bi}i∈[n], and define T1 ⊂ F2[V1] by
T1 := {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn}.
The monomials in T1 represent the possible terms in the key-polynomials before the first layer of
T-gates. Each of the up to n T-gates in the first layer requires a copy of each of {|+
t,k
(1)
t
〉}t∈T1 , with
independent random keys for each, for a total of n|T1| auxiliary states. More generally, for the ℓth
layer of T-gates, we let Tℓ be the set of possible terms in the key-polynomials before applying the
ℓth layer of T-gates. We can see from the T-gadget, as well as the construction for adding auxiliary
states that the keys from the previous layer’s auxiliary states, {k(ℓ−1)1,i , . . . , k(ℓ−1)|Tℓ−1|,i}
n
i=1, may now be
variables in the key-polynomials, and that products of terms from the previous layer may now be
terms in the key-polynomials of the current layer. (This is caused by auxiliary state addition. See
Lemma 7.1 for details). Thus, for ℓ > 1, we can define Tℓ ⊂ F2[Vℓ], where
Vℓ := Vℓ−1 ∪
{
k
(ℓ−1)
1,i , . . . , k
(ℓ−1)
|Tℓ−1|,i
}n
i=1
,
by
Tℓ := Tℓ−1 ∪ {tt′ : t, t′ ∈ Tℓ−1, t 6= t′} ∪
{
k
(ℓ−1)
1,i , . . . , k
(ℓ−1)
|Tℓ−1|,i
}n
i=1
.
We then provide each of the n wires with an auxiliary state for each term in Tℓ, for ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
We now make this more precise.
To each Tℓ, we associate a family of strings {s(ℓ)(x)}x∈{0,1}Vℓ in {0, 1}Tℓ , defined so that for every
f ∈ Tℓ, the f -entry of s(ℓ)(x) is s(ℓ)f (x) = f(x). That is, s(ℓ)(x) represents evaluating every monomial
in Tℓ at x. For instance, we have, for any strings a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, s(1)(a, b) = (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn).
For any strings s, k ∈ {0, 1}n, define
σ(s, k) :=
n⊗
i=1
|+si,ki〉〈+si,ki |.
For any string s, let s∗n denote the concatenation of n copies of s. For any a, b ∈ {0, 1}n and
k = (k(1), . . . , k(L)) ∈ {0, 1}n|T1| × · · · × {0, 1}n|TL|, define
σa,b,kaux := σ(s
(1)(a, b)∗n, k(1))⊗ · · · ⊗ σ(s(L)(a, b, k(1), . . . , k(L−1))∗n, k(L)).
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We can now define the procedure AUX.KeyGen(1κ, 1n):
1. Execute (pk, sk, evk) ← HE.KeyGen(1κ+n).
2. Choose uniform random a, b ∈ {0, 1}n and k = (k(1), . . . , k(L)) ∈ {0, 1}n|T1| × · · · × {0, 1}n|TL|.
3. Output secret key (sk, a, b, k).
4. Output evaluation key: pk, evk, a˜1 = HE.Encpk(a1), . . . , a˜n = HE.Encpk(an),
b˜1 = HE.Encpk(b1), . . . , b˜n = HE.Encpk(bn),
(
k˜
(ℓ)
i = HE.Encpk
(
k
(ℓ)
j,i
))
ℓ∈[L]
i∈[n]
j∈[|Tℓ|]
, and σa,b,kaux .
Encryption. AUX.Enc(sk,a,b,k),d : D(M) → D(C). The encryption procedure takes an extra
parameter d that keeps track of the number of qubits already encrypted (we assume d is initially 1
and not modified outside of AUX.Enc). If d ≤ n, for a single-qubit register M, it applies the
quantum one-time pad channel QEncad,bd : D(M) → D(C). The output is the cipherstate in
register C; the parameter d is updated as d← d+ 1. If d > n, then output ⊥ to indicate an error.
Decryption. AUX.Dec(sk,a,b,k),d : D(C′)→ D(M). The decryption is defined the same as CL.Decsk.
Homomorphic Evaluation. AUX.EvalC : D(Revk ⊗ C⊗n) → D(C′⊗m). For Clifford group gates,
we apply the gadgets as in CL.Eval. For T-gates, we apply the gadget in Fig. 10. The full evaluation
procedure is as follows:
1. Set V ← {ai, bi}i∈[n], and ∀ i ∈ [n], set fa,i, fb,i ∈ F2[V ] as fa,i ← ai, fb,i ← bi.
2. Let g1, . . . , gG be a topological ordering of the gates in C. For i = 1, . . . , G, evaluate gi using
the appropriate gadget.
3. Let S be the set of output wire labels. For each i ∈ S:
(a) Homomorphically evaluate fa,i and fb,i to obtain updated (encrypted) keys: a˜i ←
HE.Eval
fa,i
evk (v˜ : v ∈ V ) and b˜i ← HE.Eval
fb,i
evk(v˜ : v ∈ V ).
4. Output in C′i the classical-quantum system given by:
• The encrypted keys {a˜i, b˜i}i∈S .
• The output register corresponding to the encrypted output qubit i of the circuit.
The correctness of this scheme depends on two facts, which we prove in Sec. 7.1. First, for every
unknown v ∈ V , we have an encrypted copy of v˜, encrypted using HE.Enc. We need these to
compute the final keys {a˜i, b˜i} using fa,i, fb,i ∈ F2[V ]. Finally, for each level ℓ, for each wire label
i, we need an auxiliary state |+t,k〉 for every term that may appear in the key fa,i going into the
ℓth level. This allows us to construct the auxiliary qubit required to execute each T-gadget.
We remark that if we only had a classical encryption scheme that was homomorphic over linear
circuits, and not fully homomorphic, then we could get the same functionality from a slightly modi-
fied version of this scheme, in which we include with every auxiliary qubit |+s,k〉〈+s,k|, HE.Encpk(s)
— at the moment we only include some of these, but not those auxiliary states arising from products
of terms, since we can compute products homomorphically. Since we have classical fully homomor-
phic encryption, we use this to slightly simplify the scheme, however the observation that the fully
homomorphic property is not fully taken advantage of strengthens the idea that Clifford circuits
are analogous to classical linear circuits in the context of QHE.
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7.1 Analysis of AUX
We now analyse the various properties of AUX. Consider a layered quantum circuit C with L
layers of T-gates. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the ordering of gates g1, . . . , gG has the
property that if gi is a T-gate in level ℓ, and gj is a T-gate in level ℓ + 1, then i < j; that is, we
completely evaluate level ℓ before we begin to evaluate level ℓ+ 1.
Lemma 7.1. Let fa,i be a key-polynomial going into the ℓ
th layer of T-gates. Then fa,i is a sum
of terms in Tℓ.
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on ℓ. Before any gates have been applied, the key-
polynomial are fa,i = ai and fb,i = bi for i = 1, . . . , n. We can easily see from the update rules
that applying Clifford gates results in keys of the form f or f + f ′, where f and f ′ were previous
keys. Thus, after a Clifford circuit has been applied, all key-polynomial are sums of terms from
{a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn} = T1.
Let fa,1, . . . , fa,n, fb,1, . . . , fb,n be the key-polynomials going into the ℓ
th layer, and suppose they
are sums of terms in Tℓ. Let f
′
a,1, . . . , f
′
a,n, f
′
b,1, . . . , f
′
b,n be the key-polynomials right after the ℓ
th
layer of T-gates has been applied. If no T is applied on the ith wire, then f ′a,i = fa,i and f
′
b,i = fb,i,
so f ′a,i, f
′
b,i are both sums of terms in Tℓ ⊂ Tℓ+1. Suppose on the other hand that we apply a
T-gate to the ith wire at level ℓ. From the T-gadget (Fig. 10), we see that after applying a T to
the ith wire, we have new keys f ′a,i = fa,i ⊕ c for a known constant c, so f ′a,i is a sum of terms
in Tℓ ⊂ Tℓ+1; and f ′b,i = (1 ⊕ c)fa,i ⊕ fb,i ⊕ k, where k is the auxiliary state key of the auxiliary
state used to implement the gadget. If fa,i = t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tr, for t1, . . . , tr ∈ Tℓ, then we construct
|+fa,i,k〉 from auxiliary states |+t1,k1〉, . . . , |+tr ,kr〉 for some k1, . . . , kr ∈ {k(ℓ)q,i}|Tℓ|q=1 ⊂ Tℓ+1, so we
have k =
⊕r
j=1 kj ⊕
⊕r
j=2 cjtj ⊕
⊕r
j=1
⊕j−1
j′=1 tjtj′ for known c2, . . . , cr, which is the sum of terms
in Tℓ+1, since t1, . . . , tr ∈ Tℓ. Thus, f ′b,i is the sum of terms in Tℓ+1.
Thus, after applying the ℓth layer of T-gates, all key-polynomials are sums of terms from Tℓ+1.
To complete the proof, we simply observe again that Clifford circuits act additively on the keys,
and so do not introduce new terms, so just before the (ℓ+ 1)th layer of T-gates, the key-polynomials
are still sums of terms in Tℓ+1.
The bottleneck in this scheme is the number of auxiliary states required:
Lemma 7.2. The number of auxiliary qubits output by AUX.KeyGen(1κ, 1n) grows as O(n2
L−1+1)
in n.
Proof. The number of qubits encoded in σa,b,kaux is
|k(1)|+ |k(2)|+ · · ·+ |k(L)| = n|T1|+ n|T2|+ · · ·+ n|TL| = n
L∑
ℓ=1
|Tℓ|.
From the definition of Tℓ, we see that:
|T1| = 2n, and for ℓ > 1, |Tℓ| = |Tℓ−1|+
(|Tℓ−1|
2
)
+ n|Tℓ−1|.
So certainly for all ℓ > 1, |Tℓ| ≤ c|Tℓ−1|2 for some constant c, and thus |Tℓ| ≤ cℓ−1(2n)2ℓ−1 ∈
O(n2
ℓ−1
). Thus n
∑L
ℓ=1 |Tℓ| ∈ O(n2
L−1+1).
We thus have the following theorem:
26
Theorem 7.3. Let Sn be the class of all quantum circuits on n wires with T-depth at most L, and
let S = {Sn}n∈N. Then AUX is S -homomorphic and compact.
We now consider the security of the scheme.
Theorem 7.4. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then AUX is q-IND-CPA secure.
We will prove Thm. 7.4 in several parts. To begin, we will show that an adversary that in-
teracts with AUX.KeyGen can’t do much better than an adversary that interacts instead with an
altered version of AUX.KeyGen, KeyGen′, in which every classical encryption has been replaced
with HE.Encpk(0) (Lemma 7.5). Then we will be able to complete the proof by showing that an
adversary interacting with KeyGen′ instead of AUX.KeyGen can’t win the q-IND-CPA experiment
for AUX with probability better than 12 .
Lemma 7.5. Define a QHE scheme AUX′ such that AUX′.KeyGen(1κ, 1n) = KeyGen′(1κ, 1n),
where KeyGen′ behaves identically to AUX.KeyGen, except it replaces every classical encryption
HE.Encpk(x) with HE.Encpk(0). Let AUX
′.Enc = AUX.Enc, AUX′.Dec = AUX.Dec and AUX′.Eval =
AUX.Eval. Then for any quantum polynomial-time adversary A = (A1,A2) with encryption oracle
access, there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX(κ) = 1]− Pr[SymKcpaA ,AUX′(κ) = 1] ≤ η(κ).
Thus, we can restrict our attention to adversaries that make no use of the classical encryptions,
since they add at most a negligible advantage.
Proof. We will define an adversary A ′ = (A ′1 ,A
′
2) for the quantum CPA-mult indistinguishability
experiment for HE, PubKcpa-mult
A ′,HE (κ). Essentially, A
′ will run AUX.KeyGen, except it will use the
challenger Ξcpa-multHE in place of HE.Encpk, so that it is either running AUX.KeyGen or KeyGen
′. It
will then simulate the SymK experiment, and if A wins, it will guess that it ran the original version
of AUX.KeyGen, and otherwise it will guess that it ran KeyGen′.
A ′1(pk, evk): A
′
1 chooses uniform random bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1}n and k ∈ {0, 1}N , where N =
n|T1|+ · · ·+ n|TL|, and gives m0 = 0 = 02n+N and m1 = (a, b, k) to the challenger Ξcpa-multHE ,
which outputs either c1 = HE.Encpk(a, b, k), or c0 = HE.Encpk(0).
A ′2(c): A
′
2 computes σ
a,b,k
aux and gives σ
a,b,k
aux , pk, evk, c to A1. A1 may make several oracle calls,
which A ′2 can simulate, because it has a, b and so can run AUX.Enc. When A1 outputs a
message to the challenger, A ′2 samples a random bit r, and runs Ξ
cpa,r
AUX , which it can simulate,
since it has a, b, and so can run AUX.Enc. A ′2 then gives the challenge to A2, and if A2
outputs r, A ′2 outputs 1, and otherwise, A
′
2 outputs 0.
We now calculate the probability that A ′ correctly guesses which of c0 and c1 it received from the
challenger, which we know must be less than 12 + η(κ + n) for some negligible function, since HE
is q-IND-CPA, κ + n is the security parameter given to HE.KeyGen, and |m0| = |m1| = 2n +N =
O(poly(n)) = O(poly(n + κ)). If A ′ received c0, then it acted as KeyGen′, whereas if it received
c1, it acted as AUX.KeyGen. In the former case, the probability that A
′ correctly guesses 0 is the
probability that A loses the SymK experiment when it interacts with AUX′, Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX′
(κ) = 0].
In the latter case, the probability that A ′ correctly guesses 1 is the probability that A wins the
27
SymK experiment when it interacts with AUX, Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX(κ) = 1]. Thus, since HE is q-IND-
CPA, there exists a negligible function η′ such that
1
2
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX′
(κ) = 0] +
1
2
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η′(κ)
1− Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX′
(κ) = 1] + Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX(κ) = 1] ≤ 1 + 2η′(κ)
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX(κ) = 1]− Pr[SymKcpaA ,AUX′(κ) = 1] ≤ 2η′(κ).
Setting η = 2η′ completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that the output of KeyGen′ is actually (pk, evk, $), which is independent
of a, b, k. The proof of Lemma 7.6 is mainly computational, and provides little insight, so we
relegate it to App. E.
Lemma 7.6. Let N = n|T1|+ · · ·+ n|TL|. For any a, b ∈ {0, 1}n,
∑
k∈{0,1}N σ
a,b,k
aux =
1
2N
I2N .
To complete the proof of Thm. 7.4, we show that no adversary interacting with AUX.KeyGen′
can win the experiment SymKcpa with probability better than 12 .
Lemma 7.7. For any adversary A = (A1,A2) with access to an encryption oracle,
Pr[SymKcpa
A ,AUX′
(κ) = 1] =
1
2
.
Proof. Let q be the number of oracle calls made by A1, and write A1 = (A
(1)
1 , . . . ,A
(q+1)
1 ). Let q
′
be the number of oracle calls made by A2, and write A2 = (A
(1)
2 , . . . ,A
(q′+1)
2 ). If q ≥ n, then the
challenger just outputs ⊥, independent of r, so certainly in that case A cannot win with probability
more than 12 , so suppose q < n. If q+ q
′+1 > n, then the last q+ q′+1−n oracle calls made by A2
simply return ⊥, which A could simulate without actually making these oracle calls, so suppose
without loss of generality that q + q′ + 1 ≤ n.
The output of AUX′.KeyGen = KeyGen′ to A (1)1 is (pk, evk, σ
a,b,k
aux ), and by Lemma 7.6, for any
a, b, this is equal to (pk, evk, 1
2N
I2N ). Thus, the interaction of KeyGen
′ with the experiment is
shown in part (a) of Fig. 11. KeyGen′ chooses random bits a1, b1, . . . , aq+q′+1, bq+q′+1, for use in
oracle calls and the challenge itself, but these are independent of the information given to A by
KeyGen′. (The other random bits selected by KeyGen′, aq+q′+2, bq+q′+2, . . . , an, bn and the string k,
are independent of the interaction with the adversary, so we ignore them.)
It is then easy to see from Fig. 11 that every call to the encryption oracle can be replaced by a
channel that discards the input and returns a completely mixed state, since for any input ρM, the
encryption oracle returns
Tr1
1
4
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
|a, b〉〈a, b|1 ⊗ XaZbρMZbXa
 = 1
4
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
XaZbρMZbXa =
1
2
I2.
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Figure 11: Proof of Lemma 7.7. Part (a) shows how KeyGen′ interacts with the experiment. The
channel $ outputs a completely mixed state, or equivalently, a uniform random variable. Since the
random bits ai, bi are independent of the other outputs of KeyGen
′, for each i, we can replace each
of the oracle calls as well as the challenger with a channel that discards the input and returns a
completely mixed state, as shown in part (b). Thus, the experiment is independent of r from the
perspective of A , and so A can do no better than guessing r.
In other words, we have:
$
a, b
MQEnca,b C
≡ M $ C
Here $ denotes the channel that outputs a completely mixed state, or equivalently, a uniform
random variable.
For the same reason, the call to the challenger Ξcpa,rAUX can also be replaced with the channel that
discards the input and returns $, since Ξcpa,rAUX applies a quantum one-time pad using random keys
aq+1, bq+1 to the input or to |0〉〈0|, and in either case, the resulting state is the completely mixed
state. Thus, from the perspective of A , the experiment is independent of r, as shown in part (b)
of Fig. 11. Thus, an adversary cannot win with probability better than 12 .
Combining Lemma 7.5 and Lemma 7.7 proves Thm. 7.4 immediately.
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8 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this work, we have presented three quantum homomorphic encryption schemes. The first, CL,
is a stepping stone to the other two, and is homomorphic and compact for the class of stabilizer
circuits. The second, EPR, is homomorphic for all quantum circuits, but the compactness property
degrades with the number of T-gates. In the third scheme, AUX, the complexity of the evaluation
key and the evaluation procedure scale doubly exponentially with the T-depth, so that it is only
homomorphic for circuits with constant T-depth, but it is also compact.
The clear central open problem in this work is to come up with a quantum fully homomorphic
encryption scheme satisfying Def. 3.8, which must be homomorphic for all quantum circuits and
compact. Our schemes EPR and AUX make progress towards this goal from two directions, but still
leave open a full solution to this problem.
Our work can be seen as analogous to a number of classical results leading up to fully ho-
momorphic encryption, including classical encryption schemes that were homomorphic for some
limited classes of circuits, including limits in the multiplicative depth, as well as quasi-compact ho-
momorphic schemes. In addition, we have attempted, in our security definitions and the theorems
in App. B, to set the groundwork for a rigorous treatment of quantum homomorphic encryption,
hopefully leading, eventually to quantum fully homomorphic encryption.
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A Classical Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Here we present the definitions from the full version of [BV11].
Definition A.1. A homomorphic encryption scheme is a 4-tuple (HE.KeyGen,HE.Enc,HE.Dec,HE.Eval) of
PPT algorithms such that:
Key Generation. The algorithm (pk, evk, sk) ← HE.KeyGen(1κ) takes a unary representation of the se-
curity parameter and outputs a public encryption key pk, a public evaluation key evk and a secret
decryption key sk.
Encryption. The algorithm c ← HE.Encpk(µ) takes the public key pk and a single bit message µ ∈ {0, 1}
and outputs a ciphertext c.
Decryption. The algorithm µ∗ ← HE.Decsk(c) takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a
message µ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Homomorphic Evaluation. The algorithm cf ← HE.Evalfevk(c1, . . . , cℓ) takes the evaluation key evk, a
classical circuit f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} and a set of ℓ ciphertexts c1, . . . , cℓ and outputs a ciphertext cf .
We define S -homomorphic, which is homomorphism with respect to a specified class S of circuits. This
notion is sometimes also referred to as “somewhat homomorphic”.
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Definition A.2 (S -homomorphic). Let S = {Sκ}κ∈N be a class of classical circuits. A scheme HE is S -
homomorphic (or, homomorphic for the class S ) if for any sequence of circuits {fκ ∈ Sκ}κ∈N and respective
inputs µ1, . . . , µℓ ∈ {0, 1} (where ℓ = ℓ(κ)), there exists a negligible function η such that
Pr[HE.Decsk(HE.Eval
f
evk(c1, . . . , cℓ)) 6= f(µ1, . . . , µℓ)] = η(κ) , (6)
where (pk, evk, sk)← HE.Keygen(1κ) and ci ← HE.Encpk(µi).
Definition A.3 (compactness). A homomorphic scheme HE is compact if there exists a polynomial p such
that the circuit complexity of decrypting the output of HE.Evalf (· · · ) is at most p(κ) (regardless of f).
Definition A.4 (fully homomorphic encryption). A scheme HE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact
and homomorphic for the class of all arithmetic circuits over F2.
B Equivalence of Definitions for q-IND-CPA
In this section, we prove Thm. 3.5 of Sec. 3.2, restated below:
Theorem 3.5 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-mult). Let QHE be a quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme. Then QHE is q-IND-CPA if and only if QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult.
In order to prove Thm. 3.5, we will first introduce an intermediate security definition, q-IND-CPA-2,
which is like q-IND-CPA-mult when we restrict to t = 1. We will show that q-IND-CPA is equivalent to
q-IND-CPA-2, and then that q-IND-CPA-2 is equivalent to q-IND-CPA-mult. We note that the proof given
in this section is easily modified to a proof of Thm. 3.15 — a similar statement for the symmetric-key setting.
The only difference in the symmetric-key case is that adversaries can make calls to an encryption oracle.
The main techniques in this section involve constructing an adversary A ′ that runs some other adversary
A . If A is an adversary with oracle access, then another adversary with oracle access, A ′, can easily run
A , so the same ideas go through in an identical manner in the symmetric-key case.
CPA-2 security. The CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment is given below and illustrated in Fig. 12.
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Figure 12: The quantum IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment.
The quantum IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment PubK
cpa-2
A ,QHE(κ)
1. KeyGen(1κ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρevk).
2. AdversaryA1 is given (pk, ρevk) and outputs a quantum state ρ inM0⊗M1⊗E , whereM0 ≡M1 ≡M
3. For r ∈ {0, 1}, let Ξcpa-2,rQHE : D(M0⊗M1)→ D(C) be given by Ξcpa-2,0QHE (ρ) = TrM1
(
(EncM0pk ⊗ IM1)(ρ)
)
and Ξcpa-2,1QHE (ρ) = TrM0
(
(IM0 ⊗ EncM1pk )(ρ)
)
. A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξcpa-2,rQHE ⊗ IE is
applied to ρ (the output being a state in C ⊗ E).
4. Adversary A2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r′.
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r′, we say that
A wins the experiment.
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Definition B.1 (q-IND-CPA-2). A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA-2 secure
if for all quantum polynomial-time adversaries A = (A1,A2) there exists a negligible function η such that:
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ,QHE(κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ η(κ) .
Theorem B.2 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-2). A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme
is q-IND-CPA if and only if it is q-IND-CPA-2.
Proof. It is trivial to see that if a scheme is q-IND-CPA-2 then it is q-IND-CPA.
Suppose a scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA. Then let A = (A1,A2) be any adversary for the experiment
PubK
cpa-2,r
A ,QHE, so A1 implements a quantum channel from D(Revk) to D(M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ E) conditioned on
pk, and A2 implements a quantum channel on D(C ⊗ E) that outputs a bit. We will use A to construct
an adversary, A ′ for the experiment PubKcpa
A ′,QHE as shown in Fig. 13. We define A
′
1 by A
′
1(pk, ρ
Revk) =
TrM0(A1(pk, ρ
Revk)), and A ′2 by A
′
2 = A2.
We now consider the probability that A ′ wins the q-IND-CPA experiment: Pr[PubKcpa
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1]. If
r = 0, the probability that r′ = r is Pr[A2((Enc(|0〉〈0|)) ⊗ ρE) = 0]. If r = 1, the probability that r′ = r is
Pr[A2((Encpk ⊗ IE )(ρM1⊗E)) = 1]. Thus, the probability that this adversary correctly predicts r is
1
2
Pr
[
A2((Enc(|0〉〈0|))⊗ ρE) = 0
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE(ρM1⊗E)) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ η′(κ), (7)
for some negligible function η′, by the fact that QHE is q-IND-CPA.
Consider a slightly different strategy, A ′′ = (A ′′1 ,A
′′
2 ), for the same experiment PubK
cpa
A ′′,QHE. This
strategy discards the second message space, M1, and inputs the first, M0, into Ξcpa,rQHE , that is A ′′1 =
TrM1(A1(pk, ρ
Revk)). The new adversary A ′′ outputs the complement of the output of A : A ′′2 (ρ
CE) =
A2(ρ
CE)⊕ 1. We can then see that A ′′ correctly predicts r with probability
1
2
Pr
[
A2((Enc(|0〉〈0|))⊗ ρE) = 1
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE(ρM0⊗E)) = 0
] ≤ 1
2
+ η′′(κ). (8)
for some negligible function η′′. The addition of (7) and (8), gives:
1
2
+
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE(ρM1⊗E)) = 1
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE (ρM0⊗E)) = 0
] ≤ 1 + η′(κ) + η′′(κ).
Since η := η′ + η′′ is still negligible, we conclude that for some negligible function η:
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE(ρM1⊗E)) = 1
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
A2(Encpk ⊗ IE(ρM0⊗E)) = 0
] ≤ 1
2
+ η(κ).
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Figure 13: The adversary A ′ described in the proof of Thm. B.2.
Theorem B.3 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-mult). A quantum homomorphic encryption
scheme is q-IND-CPA if and only if it is q-IND-CPA-mult.
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Proof. It is trivial to see that if a scheme is q-IND-CPA-mult, then it is q-IND-CPA.
For the other direction, it is simple to adapt a similar classical proof (see for example [KL08]) to the
quantum setting. Suppose QHE is q-IND-CPA, so in particular, it is q-IND-CPA-2. Let A = (A1,A2) be
an adversary for the q-IND-CPA-mult experiment PubKcpa-mult
A ,QHE . We will construct an adversary, A
′, for the
q-IND-CPA-2 experiment PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE from A .
For any i ∈ {0, . . . , t}, define Ψi : D(M10 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mt0 ⊗M11 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mt1 ⊗ E) → D(C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ct ⊗ E)
as the channel that applies Encpk to the systems M10, . . . ,Mi0,Mi+11 , . . . ,Mt1, and traces out the systems
M11, . . . ,Mi1,Mi+10 , . . . ,Mt0.
Let A = (A1,A2) be a t-message adversary for q-IND-CPA-mult. We define a q-IND-CPA-2 adversary
A ′ = (A ′1 ,A
′
2) as follows:
A ′1(pk, ρ
Revk): Run A1(pk, ρ
Revk) to get ρ ∈ D(M10⊗· · ·⊗Mt0⊗M11⊗· · ·⊗Mt1⊗E). Choose a random i ∈
{1, . . . , t}, and apply Ξcpa-2,rQHE to the systemMi0,Mi1. For j < i, apply Encpk toMj0 and label the output
as Cj . For j > i, apply Encpk to Mj1, and label the output as Cj. Let E ′ =
(⊗t
j=1:j 6=i Cj
)
⊗ E ⊗Ct+1.
Record i in the last register.
A
′
2 : D(C ⊗ E ′)→ {0, 1}: Label the output of Ξcpa-2,rQHE , C, as Ci. Apply A2 to the system C1⊗ · · · ⊗ Ct⊗E , to
get a bit r′. Output r′.
We now consider the success probability of A ′ on PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE. Let ρ = A1(pk, ρ
Revk). We first note that if
A ′1 selects i, then if r = 0, the state passed to A
′
2 is Ψi(ρ), but if r = 1, the state passed to A
′
2 is Ψi+1(ρ).
So if r = 0, then the success probability is:
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1|r = 0] =
t∑
i=1
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψi(ρ)) = 0].
And if r = 1, then the success probability is:
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1|r = 1] =
t∑
i=1
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψi+1(ρ)) = 1] =
t−1∑
i=0
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψi(ρ)) = 1].
From these two equations, we can compute:
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1]
=
1
2
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1|r = 0] +
1
2
Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) = 1|r = 1]
=
1
2
(
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψ0(ρ)) = 1] +
t−1∑
i=1
1
t
(Pr[A2(Ψi(ρ)) = 0] + Pr[A2(Ψi(ρ)) = 1]) +
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψt(ρ)) = 0]
)
=
1
2
(
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψ0(ρ)) = 1] +
t− 1
t
+
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψt(ρ)) = 0]
)
.
Since QHE is assumed to be q-IND-CPA, there exists a negligible function η′ such that Pr[PubKcpa-2
A ′,QHE(κ) =
1] ≤ 12 + η′(κ), so we can compute:
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψ0(ρ)) = 1] +
t− 1
t
+
1
t
Pr[A2(Ψt(ρ)) = 0] ≤ 1 + 2η′(κ). (9)
Note that Ψ0(ρ) =
(
(Encpk)
⊗t ⊗ IE
)
(ρ(
⊗
t
j=1 M
j
1)⊗E) and Ψt(ρ) =
(
(Encpk)
⊗t ⊗ IE
)
(ρ(
⊗
t
j=1 M
j
0)⊗E), so
1
2 Pr[A2(Ψ0(ρ)) = 1] +
1
2 Pr[A2(Ψt(ρ)) = 0] = Pr[PubK
cpa-mult
A ,QHE (κ) = 1]. From Equation (9), we get:
Pr[PubKcpa-mult
A ,QHE (κ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ t · η′(κ).
It must be the case that t = O(poly(κ)), since A is a QPT algorithm, so t · η′(κ) is negligible in κ. Setting
η = t · η′ completes the proof.
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Figure 14: The strategy described in the proof of Thm. B.3 for the case t = 2, when i = 2.
C Key Update Rules for Stabilizer Elements
We review here the key update rules for performing stabilizer/Clifford operators on quantum data encrypted
with the quantum one-time pad [Got98].
Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 cXi fa,i ← fa,i
Figure 15: Protocol for measurement on the ith wire: Simply perform the measurement. The
resulting bit, c, can be decrypted by applying Xfa,i (The key fb,i is no longer relevant).
|0〉 X0Z0|0〉Xi fa,i ← 0, fb,i ← 0
Figure 16: Protocol for auxiliary qubit preparation on a new wire, i: Initialize a new wire labelled
Xi and new key-polynomials fi,a = fb,i = 0.
Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 XiX X
fa,iZfb,iX|ψ〉 fa,i ← fa,i, fb,i ← fb,i
Figure 17: Protocol for an X-gate on the ith wire: Simply apply the X-gate.
Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 XiZ X
fa,iZfb,iZ|ψ〉 fa,i ← fa,i, fb,i ← fb,i
Figure 18: Protocol for a Z-gate on the ith wire: Simply apply the Z-gate.
Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 XiH X
fb,iZfa,iH|ψ〉 fa,i ← fb,i, fb,i ← fa,i
Figure 19: Protocol for an H-gate on the ith wire: Apply the gate and swap the key-polynomials.
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Xfa,iZfb,i |ψ〉 XiP X
fa,iZfb,i⊕fa,iP|ψ〉 fa,i ← fa,i, fb,i ← fb,i ⊕ fa,i
Figure 20: Protocol for a P-gate on the ith wire: Apply the gate and update fb,i.
(Xfa,iZfb,i ⊗ Xfa,jZfb,j)|ψ〉
{ }
(Xfa,iZfb,i⊕fb,j ⊗ Xfa,i⊕fa,jZfb,j )CNOT(|ψ〉)
fa,i ← fa,i, fb,i ← fb,i ⊕ fb,j, fa,j ← fa,i ⊕ fa,j, fb,j ← fb,j
Xi
Xj
Figure 21: Protocol for a CNOT-gate with control wire i and target wire j: Apply the gate and
update fb,i and fa,j.
We remark that an alternative gadget for the X is to update the X-key as fa,i → fa,i ⊕ 1, rather than
applying X to the quantum state. A similar alternative holds for the Z-gadget. However, these are the only
two gates for which a key update is sufficient to affect the gate. Since we are actually carrying out quantum
computations on encrypted quantum data — in contrast to merely simulating a quantum computation —
all gates except the Pauli gates require actual quantum operations to be applied during evaluation.
D Correctness of the T-gate Gadget
We give below a step-by-step proof of the correctness of the T-gate protocol from Fig. 8. The basic building
block is the circuit identity for an X-teleportation from [ZLC00], which we re-derive here. Also of relevance
to this work are the techniques developed by Childs, Leung, and Nielsen [CLN05] to manipulate circuits that
produce an output that is correct up to known Pauli corrections.
We will make use of the following identities which all hold up to an irrelevant global phase: XZ = ZX,
PZ = ZP, PX = XZP, TZ = ZT, TX = XZPT, P2 = Z and Pa⊕b = Za·bPa+b (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}).
1. Our first circuit identity (Fig. 22) swaps a qubit |ψ〉 with the state |+〉 and is easy to verify.
|ψ〉 • |+〉
|+〉 • |ψ〉
Figure 22: Circuit identity (easy to verify).
2. We can measure the top qubit in the above circuit and classically control the output correction
(Fig. 23). We have thus re-derived the circuit corresponding to the “X-teleportation” of [ZLC00].
|ψ〉 c
|+〉 • Xc|ψ〉
Figure 23: X-teleportation
3. Let the input be TXaZb|ψ〉, and add two gates on the auxiliary wire, Pa and Zk (Fig. 24). Using the
fact that P and Z commute with control, and applying identities given above, we get as output (using
TX = XZPT):
PaZkXcTXaZb|ψ〉 = PaZkXcXaZa⊕bPaT|ψ〉. (10)
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This is equal to (simplifying, then pushing the first P to the end):
PaXa⊕cZa⊕b⊕kPaT|ψ〉 = Xa⊕cZ(a⊕c)aPaZa⊕b⊕kPaT|ψ〉
= Xa⊕cZa
2⊕c·a⊕a⊕b⊕kP2aT|ψ〉
= Xa⊕cZc·a⊕a⊕b⊕kT|ψ〉 since a2 = a and P2 = Z.
XaZb|ψ〉 T c
|+〉 Pa Zk • Xa⊕cZa⊕b⊕k⊕a·cT|ψ〉
Figure 24: Final circuit for T gate.
E Proof of Lemma 7.6
Lemma 7.6 Let N = n|T1|+ · · ·+ n|TL|. For any a, b ∈ {0, 1}n,
∑
k∈{0,1}N σ
a,b,k
aux =
1
2N
I2N .
Proof. We first note that for any string s of length |s|:
∑
k∈{0,1}|s|
σ(s, k) =
∑
k∈{0,1}|s|
|s|⊗
i=1
ZkiPsi |+〉〈+|PsiZki =
|s|⊗
i=1
∑
k∈{0,1}
ZkPsi |+〉〈+|PsiZk
=
|s|⊗
i=1
∑
k∈{0,1}
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|+ i2k+a|0〉〈1|+ i2k−a|1〉〈0|)
=
|s|⊗
i=1
(
2I2 + (i
2+a + ia)|0〉〈1|+ (i2−a + i−a)|1〉〈0|)
= (2I2)
⊗|s|
= 2|s|I2|s| .
Then it is easy to see that for any a, b ∈ {0, 1}n:∑
k∈{0,1}N
σa,b,kaux =
∑
k(1)∈{0,1}n|T1|,...,
k(L)∈{0,1}n|TL|
σ(s(1)(a, b)∗n, k(1))⊗ · · · ⊗ σ(s(L)(a, b, k(1), . . . , k(L−1))∗n, k(L))
=
∑
k(1)∈{0,1}n|T1|
σ(s(1)(a, b)∗n, k(1))⊗
∑
k(2)∈{0,1}n|T2|
σ(s(2)(a, b, k(1))∗n, k(2))⊗ . . .
⊗
∑
k(L)∈{0,1}n|TL|
σ(s(L)(a, b, k(1), . . . , k(L−1))∗n, k(L))
=
∑
k(1)∈{0,1}n|T1|
σ(s(1)(a, b)∗n, k(1))⊗
∑
k(2)∈{0,1}n|T2|
σ(s(2)(a, b, k(1))∗n, k(2))⊗ . . .
⊗
∑
k(L−1)∈{0,1}n|TL−1|
σ(s(L−1)(a, b, k(1), . . . , k(L−2))∗n, k(L−1))⊗ 2n|TL|I2n|TL|
= 2n|T1|+···+n|TL|I2n|T1|+···+n|TL| .
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